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  There are two sides to every COIN:  
On the balance between (economic) carrots and (military) sticks in 
confronting Myanmar's insurgencies 
 
 
 
Introduction: democracy and insurgencies 
In recent years, Myanmar has drawn renewed interest on the wake of the ongoing - and still partial - 
liberalization process, started by its military ruling elite. Even if the general elections held in 2010 
reconfirmed the dominant role of the Burmese armed forces (the Tatmadaw) through a substantial victory 
of the Union Solidarity and Development Party - USDP (heir of the formerly-ruling junta-run State Peace 
and Development Council - SPDC) the same year also marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of 
the country, characterized by democratic openings of which the freeing first and the admission in 
parliament later of Aung San Suu Kyi is the most obvious example. But Myanmar is also home to the most 
long-lasting still active insurgencies: indeed the government's capacity to effectively rule and administer 
peripheral areas of the country has been challenged since independence by a vast array of non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs), mostly but not exclusively organized around ethnic identities. Unresolved insurgencies and 
the ways in which the government handles (and will handle) them is central to Myanmar's transition in 
more than one way. 
In the first place, democratizations are statistically characterized by higher levels of violence due to greater 
political mobilization and to the use of potentially disruptive ethnic, nationalist or otherwise identitarian 
narratives as a way to build or hold on political capital.1 Given the number of insurgencies already in the 
background in Myanmar, the mix with a political transition could indeed prove dangerous not only to 
democratization itself but also to hopes to reach a substantial national reconciliation. Effective conflict 
management, reduction - and hopefully resolution - are thus indispensable in order to mark for a successful 
regime change and for building a renewed and non-contentious national identity. On the top of this, the 
way in which the government handles Myanmar's internal struggles and deals with minorities has very 
tangible political consequences for the government itself, both domestically (as it influences the degree of 
political support the USDP can expect from the both the Bamar majority and from the various minorities) 
and internationally (as it plays on the believability of the ruling elite commitment toward liberalization, 
which in turn is essential to the international re-alignment of the country). Hence, in dealing with domestic 
insurgencies the USDP-Tatmadaw ruling elite has good motives for both not relinquishing on the use of 
force and yet to weigh it carefully, in order to keep the country together, hold their grasp on power and not 
jeopardize their international agenda: their chances of success depends on how well they manage to thread 
on this fine line. 
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The core interest of this article rests on the strategy enacted by Myanmar's government to counter, contain 
and re-absorb insurgencies, something that is only partly inscribed in the so called "peace process". More 
specifically, the government activity vis the insurgencies is assessed in two core dimensions: economic and 
military. About the first, it is followed and further explored the approach suggested by Jake Sherman in 
2003.2 His study of the post-89 wave of ceasefires in Myanmar fits into the frame of the economic 
explanations of conflict that become popular in the early 2000.3 Starting from the now widely-accepted 
assumption that war can provide an "alternative system of profit and power" that advantages some groups 
at the expenses of others - and thus that for certain actors may be profitable to sustain war and evade 
peace4 - Sherman took one step further arguing that the same logic could also work in reverse, as economic 
self-interest can create incentives to cease hostilities. In this perspective, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council - SLORC (name used by Myanmar's military junta from 1988 to 1997) was able to use 
economic incentives - or "carrots" - in order to propose palatable conditions to ethnic militias and agree 
ceasefires that, while not entailing any actual demobilization, managed to last for significant spans of time 
(in some cases up to today) and were a successful instrument of conflict reduction. At the same time, 
evaluating the economic aspect per se would be insufficient, as economic sweet-deals have not been 
universally offered by Myanmar's government. Its military tradition is also synonymous with the use of 
classic coercive counterinsurgency. For this reason - and also because conflict analysis should not be 
confined exclusively to issues related to resources only5 - economic "carrots" are evaluated along with 
military "sticks". This coupling of "sticks and carrots" is useful for two sets of reasons: it allows to better 
grasp the overall government strategy aimed at counter, contain and re-absorb insurgents on one hand and 
to account for cycles of conflict resurgence or reduction in the country on the other.  
The analysis is developed in diachronic perspective, spanning over three key phases. The first one, meant to 
provide the needed historical background and benchmark, is the post-89 SLORC period, characterized by 
the dissolution of the Communist Part of Burma (CPB) and by the introduction of the practice of the 
ceasefires. The other two time-spans focus on the current transition, roughly splitting it into two halves as 
they refer to the years 2008-11 and 2011-15 respectively. The first starts from the coming into force of the 
new constitution and ends just short of the new peace plan proposed by the Thein Sein administration; the 
second one begins from where the first ends to run all the way up to the signing of new draft nationwide 
cease-fire agreement. While the first is significant in exposing patterns of continuity and change in the 
government policies addressed at facing insurgencies in the wake of the liberalization, the second 
highlights later policy adjustments, thus allowing to evaluate the depth and pervasiveness of change - if any 
- and the measure in which is real or cosmetic. For each of these three phases, the activities of the 
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government in face of three major insurgencies are considered: 1) those active in Shan state, with specific 
attention devoted to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the United Wa State 
Army (UWSA); 2) that lead by the Kachin Indipendence Organization (KIO) and; 3) the one conducted by 
Karen National Union (KNU).6 The rationale for case-selection is straightforward, as the cases represent the 
most significant insurgencies, with UWSA, KIO and KNU being (or having been) among the largest NSAGs. 
Although their fortunes had ups and downs through different times each managed to reach a strength of at 
least 10,000 men in arms at some point, and the largest of the three - the UWSA - currently fields about 20-
30,000.7 The MNDAA, also known as Kokang Army, appears as an exception, as it cannot compare with the 
others in term of numbers or power (estimates putting it at roughly 1-2,000 men), yet it has to be included 
for three reasons: because historically it was the first NSAG to sign a ceasefire with the government; 
because it is central to the persistence of insurrectional violence in post-2010 Myanmar; and because there 
is a triangular relationship connecting the government, UWSA and MNDAA, and thus would be artificial to 
exclude it from the analysis. In sum, by moving through the three phases previously summarized (post-
1989; 2008-11 and 2011-15) it is observed how Myanmar's government overall balanced between 
economic incentives and military pressure in the face of these three insurgencies (Shan state, KIO and KNU). 
 
Historical precedents: the post-89 ceasefires 
After the 8888 Uprising in August 1988 and the re-institution of martial law under the newly formed SLORC 
in September of the same year, Myanmar (at the time still officially designed as Burma) was in for one more 
historical twist. In Summer 1989 the oldest insurgent organization active in the country - the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB), operating mostly in Shan state - dissolved out of waning support from its historical 
ally - China - and of increasing internal fragmentation. As a result, the ideological rebellion led by the CPB, 
capable to mobilize also the Bamar, was replaced by a number of smaller identitarian insurgencies: UWSA 
and MNDAA were among the newborn organizations (although they were not the only CPB spin-offs). The 
CPB meltdown posed an immediate danger for the freshly instituted SLORC, as it opened up the possibility 
of an alliance between the old ethno-nationalist insurgencies grouped in the National Democratic Front 
(NDF) - which included, among others, the KIO and the KNU - and the new ethno-nationalist insurgencies 
originated from the CPB dissolution. In a context were pushing back pro-democracy thrusts was also a 
priority, the SLORC decided to take the initiative in order to minimize the risks of a dangerous alliance 
between his enemies: it thus proposed attractive deals to some CPB spin-offs as alternatives to offers 
coming from the NDF. Major-General Khin Nyunt, at the time SLORC Secretary-1 and Head of military 
intelligence was the main architect behind the initiative. The deals proposed were quite simple as they 
basically included a cease-fire, the possibility for NSAGs to carry on their own economic activities along 
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with a promise for economic development, and entailed no disarmament or demobilization.8 The economic 
dimension implied in the deals was particularly attractive also given the posture change of bordering 
countries - China and Thailand - that gradually became less supportive toward the insurgencies and their 
trade needs and more interested in closing business deals with Yangon's government instead. The SLORC 
summed up his new narrative in the "peace through development" motto, that had its tangible 
manifestation in the 1989 "Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races" (later 
updated in 1994), that postulated growing investment and development for peripheral regions. In 1989 the 
MNDAA led by Peng Jiasheng was the first NSAG to close a ceasefire with the SLORC, quickly followed by 
the UWSA in the same year. Given that one of the reasons behind CPB dissolution was divergence on the 
tolerability of drug-related revenues as a source of sustainment for the insurgency, it is easy to see how the 
ceasefire proposals appeared attractive for groups such as the MNDAA and the UWSA. Not surprisingly, in 
following years the Myanmar government has been more aggressive against narco-activities led by non-
ceasefire groups, while MNDAA and UWSA enjoyed relatively relaxed deadlines for opium crop reduction 
(2003 and 2005 respectively). As a consequence, the overall volume of opium export from Myanmar grown 
steadily through the mid-90s, before starting to decline.9 
The post-89 ceasefire offers shifted away from the more forceful approach up to then used by the Burmese 
government to tackle insurgencies, known as the "Four cuts" (Pya Ley Pya) strategy and aimed at cutting 
out rebel sources of recruitment, food, financing and information through the use of military might, forced 
resettlement and crop destruction.10 However, it was not a radically new move, since deals (albeit of a 
different kind) were closed with NSAGs the past as well. In the 60s and 70s, the government was used to 
co-opt militias (called Ka Kway Yay - KKY) in Shan state by allowing them to freely police and trade in their 
areas, in order to further government policies in zones were the Tatmadaw did not have easy access and to 
contrast other insurgent groups.11 It could be said that the post-89 ceasefire strategy was a substantial 
refurbishment of the KKY approach, meant not only to decrease chances of alliances between different 
NSAGs but also to increase government penetration in areas in which Yangon had limited influence and, to 
some extent, even to initiate subtle forms of military cooperation. This renewed strategy had also 
significant military effects. It should be noted that after the CPB meltdown the largest active NSAG in Shan 
state was the Mong Tai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa, counting around 15,000 men and previously involved 
in the KKY system under a different name. After the CBP dissolution UWSA clashes with the MTA were 
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frequent and this, along with the military pressure applied directly by the Tatmadaw, brought to the 
disbanding of the MTA, also eased by an attractive offer for surrender addressed personally at Khun Sa. 
More generally, the closing of ceasefires allowed to the government and to the Tatmadaw to increase their 
presence and influence in areas where they were previously barred, concentrate their strength and 
resources against a smaller number of adversaries, build up and enhance dual-use (civilian and military) 
infrastructures (above all roads), and improve the overall control of borders (in turn essential to put in 
check insurgent sources of revenues). 
The logic that worked straightforwardly for UWSA and MNDAA in Shan state affected also the KIO, albeit 
through a different path. Founded in 1961 in reaction to growing pro-Buddhist and anti-federalist stances in 
Yangon, the KIO conducted a steady campaign of insurgence up to 90s. After more than 30 years of armed 
struggle, KIO's Chairman Brang Seng saw the continuation of insurgency as a path that could lead to limited 
accomplishments and considered the option to conduct politics from within the "legal fold" in order to 
bring a change: hence, he agreed on ceasefire with SLORC in 1994. Before the ceasefire, the unrelenting 
pressure applied by the Tatmadaw made the KIO 4th brigade split from the main organization, negotiating a 
separate truce in 1991 and becoming then known as Kachin Defence Army (KDA). Several economic 
projects were then started in the newly formed Special Region-5 under KDA control, including schools, 
hospitals and hydropower plants. The KIO, on the other hand did not just lose one of his units, but also 
found itself in competition with its former brigade, as Special Region-5 was overlapping with areas still in its 
hands. The risk of facing economic underdevelopment and of having the Kachin nation falling piecemeal 
under the mix of military pressure and economic incentives coming from the SLORC were thus probable 
factors weighing on Brang Seng choice. As it happened in Shan state, the new ceasefire generated 
improvement in the region's economy, but also eased, enhanced and enlarged Tatmadaw penetration.12 
Through the 90s, a tentative dialogue between the KNU and the SLORC took place as well. Differently from 
the other cases considered, the KNU held tight on his "politics first" agenda asking for nationwide political 
changes, thus not getting allured by the "peace through development" option. The KNU rigid stance, due to 
both preferences of its leadership and of the Karen diaspora, blocked any compromise with the SLORC.13 At 
about the same time, KNU internal grievances brought to the spinoff of the Democratic Karen Buddhist 
Army (DKBA), which quickly came to terms with the SLORC - also thanks to economic incentives14 - and 
started cooperating with the Tatmadaw, providing it with much needed information on Karen-controlled 
territory. In late 1994, a DKBA offensive logistically supported by the Tatmadaw brought to the fall of the 
KNU headquarters first (Manerplaw, January 1995) and of a KNU major base later (Kaw Moo Rah, March 
1995). Since then, the KNU has been in substantial military decline and in early 2004 negotiations with the 
government started again, with an historical meeting between Bo Mya (by then no longer the KNU 
Chairman, but still an important figure in the movement) and Khin Nyunt (by then Myanmar Prime 
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Minister). However, an unfortunate breaking of the informal ceasefire by some KNU troops froze the 
process, than then came to an halt after the political fall of Khin Nyunt later in the year. 15 
In the literature, the post-89 ceasefires have been presented mainly as an effective instrument of conflict 
management and reduction (although not of resolution) in the hands of the government,16 and the deals 
offered as differently attractive for the various NSAGs depending on the respective agendas (more or less 
business-oriented).17 However, along with the aims of each specific NSAG, it should also be observed that 
ceasefire offers have been more or less enticing on the base of the military pressure applied by the 
Tatmadaw and the degree of fragmentation of each NSAG. Spinoff groups from both the KIO and the KNU 
accepted ceasefires quickly after leaving their former organization, and while the KIO decided to follow suit 
the example coming from its KDA spinoff thus enjoying some "carrots", the hardliner preference of the KNU 
had it suffer by the "stick" instead. 
 
The sour taste of liberalization: 2008-11 
The year 2008 marked the beginning of Myanmar's transition with the coming into force of the new 
constitution. This latter, unfortunately, soon proved to be source of renewed contention with insurgent 
groups, as it hints at the opportunity to dissolve armed forces others than the Tatmadaw.18 In April 2009 
the SPDC announced a plan aimed at transforming ceasefire militias into border guard forces (BGF) 
integrated into the Tatmadaw. While not entailing a complete demobilization of personnel, the plan 
mandated for the substantial dismantling of NSAGs, as it postulated to create small and separated units of 
326 personnel each, of which 30 would be from the Tatmadaw (including one of the three majors in charge 
of the unit). This, along with the required divorce from the previous insurgent administration, basically 
meant NSAGs demobilization before any political demand was actually met. None of the major group 
accepted the plan, with DKBA being the only exception.19 Given the government interest to "normalize" 
NSAGs before the transition, the SPDC reacted to the BFG plan refusal with a renewed interest in coercive 
means, that could also be explained by a progressive loss of political palatability of Khin Nyunt ceasefire 
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heritage after his political fall in 2004 and by inspiration coming from the Sri Lankan military victory over 
the Tamil earlier in 2009.20 
With relations between SPDC and NSAGs in Shan state already declining21, the BFG plan refusal made them 
just worse. In August 2009, under the pretence of a drug-bust, the government started military operations 
in the Kokang region (an area part of Shan state) that eventually led to an escalation of hostilities and to the 
breakup of the ceasefire with the MNDAA. Even if it created some tension with bordering China, the 
military campaign was successful, at least for the time being: MNDAA leader, Peng Jiasheng, fled to China 
and his forces dispersed, while a spinoff led by his deputy Bai Suoqian accepted the BGF plan and declared 
the desire to take part into 2010 elections. It has been argued that the Kokang incident was not intended to 
deal just with small-sized MNDAA, but also to send a message to its massive neighbour, the UWSA, that 
nonetheless did not comply with the BGF plan even afterwards.22 Not even the 2010 elections and the 
coming into power of Thein Sein did bring a change of course. In early 2011 the Zwe Man Hein offensive 
was launched in Shan state against two other ceasefire groups: the National Democratic Alliance Army 
(NDAA, also known as Mongla) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP, also known as Shan State Army-
North).23 The offensive preceded by few months the new peace plan proposed by Thein Sein in August.  
In Kachin state, the Tatmadaw has steadily strengthened his presence since agreeing a ceasefire with the 
KIO in 1994. In 2003 it deployed 50 battalions, a number that in 2011 has grown up to 80, with a fourfold 
increase from 1994 levels.24 In 2009 the KIO rejected the BGF plan, while on its end the government refused 
to accept the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in the upcoming electoral contest. Achieving political 
representation has been a defining goal for the KIO, which then lamented not just the electoral exclusion 
but also the lack of any truly political dialogue with the government since the closing of the ceasefire.25 On 
this background, conflict started anew after the national elections, on 9 June 2011, following a skirmish on 
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a site connected to a Chinese-funded hydroelectric project, the Myitsone dam. Hostilities quickly escalated, 
making the 1994 ceasefire void. The dam itself has been a contentious issue, as its expected consequences 
were the flooding of 447 square kilometres, implying the relocation of 47 villages near the construction site 
and about 11,800 people, along with the destruction of various sites connected to Kachin cultural heritage. 
The project further enhanced possibility for military penetration of the Tatmadaw, while planned economic 
returns were mainly directed to China and Myanmar governments, not the locals.26 The suspension of the 
project - not his cancellation, as that would have carried massive economic penalties - that came on 30 
September 2011 has been hailed as a great democratic success, also by US President Barack Obama. 
However, it should be noted that this result came only after the project became contentious on the 
national and international levels: nationally, with the appropriation of the issue in August by Aung San Suu 
Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD); internationally, as both US and ASEAN made clear their 
cold feelings about the project.27 These development were potentially dangerous for the USPD-military 
ruling elite, as they could have brought to a loss of political ground in favour of the NLD and damaged the 
international perception of Myanmar's commitment toward liberalization. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
assume these were the actual reasons behind the project suspension and that if opposition would have 
been exclusively on the Kachin state level, the government would have probably just attempted to roll over 
it militarily. Even after the suspension of the Myitsone project, violence keep escalating, with the KIO 
suffering significant loss of ground in the face of the Tatmadaw.28  
With the KNU, on the other hand, there was no ceasefire to dispute. As previously recalled, the 
organization has been in decline since the DKBA spinoff, and  between 2005 and 2007 has been under the 
fire of several Tatmadaw offensives in northern Kayin state. It also lost one more piece (as a spinoff of its 
7th Brigade, under Htein Maung accepted a deal with the government), and found Thai tolerance for its 
activities near the border getting scarcer by the day due to growing Thai business interests in Myanmar. By 
the late 2000s, the KNU was about 5,000 strong, displaced by the DKBA as the most economically and 
militarily significant NSAG in Karen politics.29 To top things off, in 2008 KNU Secretary General, Pado Mahn 
Shar, was shot dead (allegedly by disguised DKBA militiamen),30 while its historical chairman, Bo Mya, died 
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of natural causes already in 2006.31 The 2009 BGF plan was rejected by the KNU but subscribed by the 
DKBA: as a consequence, the government encouraged the DKBA to increase its number to 9,000, and then 
to attack KNU bases while counting on Tatmadaw support.32 In August 2010 the DKBA was formally 
transformed into a border guard force integrated in the Tatmadaw.33 Differently from the Kachin case, 
several Karen parties (namely the Karen People's Party, the Ploung-Sqaw Democracy Party and the Karen 
State Democracy and Development Party) where admitted to the 2010 national elections, managing to 
secure a few parliamentary seats. 
In short, if compared with the post-89 phase, in the 2008-11 period the government leant more toward the 
"stick" than the "carrot". Substantial military pressure has been applied in all the three cases considered, 
either directly or through proxies: a behaviour that disregarded long-lasting ceasefires and did not chang 
even after the 2010 elections. It could be argued that hostilities launched in 2011 specifically (in Kachin and 
Shan state) show a distinct continuity between the Thein Sein administration and previous SPDC policy. 
While the BGF plan in itself did accomplish very little (with DKBA being the only real success story) the more 
general coercive strategy delivered some positive results as it actually generated a few compliant NSAG 
spinoffs and managed to progressively reduce the relative weight of the KNU (a traditional thorn in the side 
of the Burmese government) in Myanmar's politics.  
 
A new beginning? 2011-15 
On 18 August 2011, Thein Sein announced his new Peace Plan, dropping the requirement for NSAGs to 
transform into BGFs and publicly calling for peace negotiations to be held with all the ethnic groups. The 
new plan is structured on three-layers: 1) subscription and implementation of ceasefires at the regional 
(state) level; 2) confidence building measures, political dialogue, and plans for economic development 
conducted at the national (union) level; 3) stipulation of an "agreement for eternal peace" in front of the 
Parliament and other authorities. "Peacemaking committees" have been established at both national and 
regional levels and talks began almost immediately, with both ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups, with the 
stated aim of reaching a nationwide ceasefire.34 A negotiating team led by Aung Min (Railway Minister until 
August 2012, then Minister of the President's Office of Myanmar) was in charge of dealing with the Chin 
National Front (CNF), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS, also known as Shan State Army-South), 
the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the New Mon State Party (NMPS) and the KNU. With the 
only exception of NMSP none of these groups ever had a previous ceasefire with the government. Another 
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team, conducted by Aung Thaung (former Ministry of Industry-1 and then MP) and Thein Zaw (Former 
Ministry of Communication and then MP) was tasked with the UWSA, NDAA, KIO and SSPP.35  Between 
September 2011 and February 2012 renewed ceasefires were signed with the UWSA, NDAA, SSPP and 
NMSP.  Notable ceasefires were closed for the first time ever with the KNU, RCSS, CNF, KNPP, all of them 
between the end of 2011 and early 2012.36 To sustain the process, in November 2012 the Myanmar Peace 
Center (MPC), a government-affiliated non-profit organization, was inaugurated in Yangon. More 
importantly, in late 2013 a conference bringing together many ethnic groups was held in Laiza, Kachin state, 
with the government approval. The results were the creation of a Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team 
(NCCT), constituted of 16 members (including KIO, KNU and MNDAA, but not UWSA) that signed a common 
document: the "11-point common position of ethnic resistance organisations on Nationwide Ceasefire" (or 
"Laiza agreement"). An important step forward along the road to reach a nationwide ceasefire. 
Moving to Shan state, it is worthy to recall that between 2009 and 2011 hostilities conflict reopened with 
MNDAA, NDAA and SSPP but not with UWSA, the largest NSAG active in the region. This latter, on the other 
hand, was the first to sign a renewed ceasefire, then imitated by NDAA and SSPP and also by RCSS, which 
never subscribed to a ceasefire before. Accounts remained open with the MNDAA though, and violence 
erupted again in the Kokang region when Peng Jiasheng returned from China in February 2015. In less than 
two months, the number of refugees reached the 50,000 figure and at least 200 deaths have been 
confirmed among the combatants. The government imposed martial law over the Kokang region, while 
Thein Sein stated that "the army will not lose an inch of Myanmar territory".37 If back in 2009 the 
government decision to use military might against the MNDAA was made on the base of the Sri Lankan 
victory, that may have been a ill-fated example to follow, as the Kokang Army did not find itself with its 
back to the sea - differently from the Tamils - and could just return from China a few years later. In 
considering the role of economic factors in cycles of violence in the region, it is worthy to mention that 
Myanmar drug production has been on the rise again since 2006 with poppy cultivation reaching 57,600 
hectares in 2014.38 The director of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Myanmar, John M. 
Whalen, declared in 2014 that the local government was just "turning a blind eye" on the issue39, a 
statement that could indicate a return to the traditional way of leaving NSAGs free reign in their narcotic-
related activities in order not to stir anti-government feelings and to secure compliance on more pressing 
matters. This could account for the numbers of deal closed by government with basically all the main 
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NSAGs active in Shan region from 2011 onward. Peng Jiasheng recent return from China, on the other hand, 
may be as well linked to a desire to get back into the business. At the moment of writing (April 2015) the 
MNDAA is still belligerent. 
The launch of the new Peace Plan by Thein Sein did not bring any reduction of violence in Kachin state, 
were the situation remained tense. Several Tatmadaw offensives took place in the last years, reaching 
levels of scale and intensity defined as "inconsistent" with Thein Sein order to act only in self-defence.40 In 
December 2012 a major operation that included the use of aircrafts (a quite rare occurrence) was 
conducted near the KIO's headquarter, in Laiza, and conflict dragged on in 2013. The chimera of a possible 
de-escalation and of a ceasefire timidly surface in mid-2013, also thanks to mediation from China, although 
the KIO insisted on requesting a formal political dialogue stating their unwillingness to appease to a simple 
ceasefire. Tensions quickly resurfaced and hostilities continued through 2014, dissolving all hopes for 
suspension of conflict.41 A heavy artillery attack conducted by the Tatmadaw against a KIO training camp in 
Laiza in late 2014 (leaving 23 cadets on the ground) was presented as a crackdown on illegal logging.42 It is 
interesting to notice that even if this explanation would be true, it would be nonetheless a source of serious 
contention with the KIO, as illegal logging and timber trade (through the Chinese border) are among KIO's 
main sources of revenue.43 In short, not only the military friction between the government and the KIO 
remained high, but also appeasement on the economic front was of question. At the moment of writing the 
struggle in Kachin is ongoing as well. 
In the wake of new Peace Plan announced by Thein Sein, a first informal ceasefire was finally agreed with 
the KNU in late 2011, followed in January 2012 by the real thing - the first ever to be accepted by the KNU, 
which has confronted the government uninterruptedly since 1949.44 The military pressure applied on the 
KNU, along with the political concessions granted to it have been discussed already: it is now to time to 
turn attention to the economic dimension. The KNU managed to enjoy several benefits in consequence of 
its appeasement, and three in particular are known: "the grant of import-licences for cars (with number 
plates that limit them to movement within Kayin State); a site for a factory in a special economic zone 
outside Hpa’an; and a licence to open a tour company".45 The first of these - the grant of import licences for 
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cars - has actually been a general policy not aimed exclusively at the KNU, but to all groups agreeing to a 
ceasefire with the government. The largest groups (KNU, UWSA, NMSP) were granted 120 licences each, 
while smaller NSAGs got progressively less, according to their size. Car-import licences has quickly become 
a contentious issue, as they were perceived as a way to bribe the group leaders into complacency for 
government's initiatives; nonetheless have been accepted by the KNU and by other groups (albeit some 
sold them in order to use the revenue for the organization purposes).46 About the other two economic 
developments mentioned, in Hpa'an (capital city of Kayin state) a factory employing 150 local people was 
opened in November 2012,47 while the "MoeKo San Travel and Tour Company Limited and Trading 
Company Limited" was registered in Naypyidaw (Myanmar's capital city since 2005) in 2013, starting its 
business in June of the same year, with plans to cooperate with analogous firms in Thailand, Japan and the 
United States.48 
From 2011 onward the process meant to reach a nationwide ceasefire moved through highs and lows. Six 
official rounds of talks have been held before a draft was agreed by the NCCT and the Union Peacemaking 
Work Committee (UPWC) in the seventh, on 31 March 2015. The draft was signed in the presence of 
president Thein Sein in the Myanmar Peace Center, Yangon.49 It is a most welcome progress, as it paves the 
way to a nationwide peace agreement, given the large number of ethnic groups involved, and potentially 
opens the venue to deeper political dialogue. However, while the progress is substantial and there is room 
for optimism some caution is advisable as well. First, it is only a draft that needs to be formally accepted - 
and could possibly be amended - by both the government and each of the sixteen groups part of the NCCT. 
While changes coming from the government are unlikely (given Thein Sein blessing) things may vary on the 
other side, also given the large number of stakeholders. Second, reaching an agreement has been possible 
also because the more controversial issues has been postponed for the time being. Third, there is not a 
defined timetable and it is not clear when the actual nationwide ceasefire will eventually be signed 
(although this may prove to be a precious element of flexibility as well).50 On the top of the technical details, 
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it is also important to mention that there are relevant NSAGs - namely UWSA, RCSS and NDAA - which are 
not part of the NCCT, (albeit they currently have a ceasefire with the government) while KIO and MNDAA 
are part of the NCCT, but representatives from this latter group were not present at the signing ceremony 
in Yangon and hostilities are still running with both. Besides KIO and MNDAA, the struggle is open (at the 
moment of writing) also with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and with the small Arakan Army 
(AA), both NCCT members. On his end, famous Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner had harsh word for the draft 
ceasefire, as he mentioned the fact it has been discussed while the most intense fighting since 1987 was 
taking place and denounced it as mean to pacify ethnic groups without making any substantial political 
change.51 Following on this argument, it could be added that if one or more NSAGs now rejects the 
ceasefire draft, that would allow to shift the blame for eluding peace on insurgents, and given that military 
pressure against the KIO or the MNDAA does not seem to be currently declining, it is easy to imagine 
reasons why these two groups specifically may be not in a ideal situation to rest their arms. 
 
Conclusions: beyond the draft nationwide ceasefire 
The three cases examined - Shan, KIO, KNU - are particularly interesting when arranged in a diachronic 
fashion. While the status of NSAGs in Shan state alternated frequently between ceasefire and non-ceasefire 
- with the notable exception of the most powerful NSAG active in the region, the UWSA - in the time period 
considered on a national scale there has been a significant switch of roles between the KIO and the KNU, 
with the first re-entering hostilities after a long pause and the second finally resting its arms after a 
protracted struggle. Former KNU vice-president, Saw David Tharckabaw, in 2013 stated: "17 years-ago they 
[government] isolated the Karen by making a quick ceasefire with the other armed groups, including the 
Kachin – now it’s the Kachin’s turn to be isolated."52 Indeed, the timeline of event suggest there may be a 
deliberate strategy, or at least some strategic preferences at play. 1994 was the year of the ceasefire with 
KIO and of the birth of the DKBA as a spinoff from KNU as well: these events allowed the government and 
the Tatmadaw to exercise substantial pressure on the KIO while the Kachin front was relatively quiet. 
Through the late 90s and the first decade of 2000s the KNU went through a steady decline, suffering 
militarily from both the DKBA and the Tatmadaw, losing men, leaders and even its headquarters. The DKBA, 
on the other hand, has been so compliant with government plans to be the only major NSAG to accept the 
BFG plan.53 On this background, allowing political representation to Karen parties in the 2010 election has 
probably seen as unproblematic by Myanmar's ruling elite. Through this time the Tatmadaw also had the 
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chance for a serious military build-up in Kachin, an occasion that was not wasted. The same privilege of 
political representation granted to the Karen was not given to the Kachin, and while in June 2011 hostilities 
started again in the North, in December of the same year an informal ceasefire was agreed with the KNU. In 
short, the "divide and rule" strategy often used by the government and by the Tatmadaw on a local scale 
(of which some examples mentioned here are the KKY system and the advantages provided to UWSA and 
DKBA to counter MTA and KNU respectively) is applied also on a national scale. This may also account for 
the lost-lasting ceasefire with the UWSA, as opening a second front with such a massive opponent would 
contrast with this overall strategy. In this perspective, Bertil Lintner may have been right when he pictured 
the UWSA as the next enemy in the aim of the government.54 However, as it took about 15 years to bring 
the KNU to terms, the intention may be there, but possibly with regards to a more distant future, when 
accounts with the KIO are settled. 
Given this background, the use of economic incentives as a tool of conflict management/reduction appears 
in a different light as it indeed reduces conflict, but in order to allow the government and the Tatmadaw to 
incentivise NSAGs spinoffs, absorb these latter or use them against less-compliant groups, contrast 
alliances  between NSAGs, single-out enemies, and concentrate strength and resources against few at a 
time. In order to have a comprehensive view of Myanmar's model of illiberal peacebuilding and understand 
the overall strategy pursued by the ruling elite it is then mandatory to look at economic "carrots" along 
with military "sticks". It is also open to discussion if this overall strategy it is going to ultimately work. It may 
not have provided results quickly so far, but Myanmar's leaders do not appear to be in a hurry, and have 
already demonstrated that they can resort to the use of violence without generating a serious international 
outcry: something that fits well with their agenda, both domestically and internationally.  On the side, this 
approach also has a legitimizing effect for both the Tatmadaw and for the persistent presence of the 
military in government, as it entails the persistent need to confront enemies. This co-dependence, however, 
may also be a reason not to push things to their bitter end.55 All of this does mean that changes in the way 
Myanmar deals with its internal conflict are completely out of question, even if so far the impression is one 
of continuity with the past, at least with regard to this dimension. For substantial changes to occur, more 
time would be a necessary condition. 
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